The existence of a joy flap in the implementation phase of the peace agreement is also an inherent threat to the peace process (Shedd, 2008). Stedman (1997) divided spoilers into limited, greedy and complete spoilers, which fall into two main categories: indoor and outdoor spoilers. Greenhill and Major (2007) add another group – latent spoilers – who withdraw their commitments when they see potential successes in confronting opposition parties instead of working with them. Christoph, Janina and Sabine (2018) state in their quantitative research on para-governmental militias (PGM) that the risk of further fighting increases by 64% if a GMP is active after the agreement. Stedman, S. J., Rothchild, D., Cousens, E.M. (2002). Ending civil wars: the implementation of peace agreements. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Press. Fearon, J.
D., – Laitin, D.D. (2003). Ethnicity, insurrection and civil war. The American Political Science Review, 97 (1), 75-90. Paris, R. (2009). To understand the problem of coordination in the post-war state. In R. Paris – T. D. Sisk (Eds.), The dilemmas of statebuilding: Confronting the contradictions of postwar peace operations (p. 67-92).
London: Routledge. de Soto, A., del Castillo, G. (1995). Implementation of comprehensive peace agreements: staying the course in El Salvador. Global Governance, 1 (2), 189-203. In particular, we are moving away from the united Nations peacekeeping and united Nations transitional authority provisions. Information on these provisions is contained in the initial data set (Joshi et al. 2015). Doyle, M. W., Sambanis, N. (2000).
Consolidation of international peace: a theoretical and quantitative analysis. The American Political Science Review, 94 (4), 779-801. Gilligan, M. J., Sergenti, E. J. (2008). Do UN interventions create peace? Use of matching to improve causal conclusions. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 3(2), 89-122. On the contrary, several scholars have focused on the type of regime and the implementation of peace agreements.
In their study of 83 peace agreements (1989-2004), Jarstad and Nilsson (2018) found that democracies and autocracies show no statistically significant differences in the implementation of all types of power-sharing pacts. However, undemocratic regimes are more likely to face the risk of a failure of post-war peace (Geddes, Wright and Frantz, 2014), while military regimes are rarely at peace under undemocratic regimes (Mason and Greig, 2017). There is also another line of scientific study that studies the impact of ideological fluctuations on the implementation of peace agreements. According to Wolford (2007), new governments tend to be rather reluctant to implement the agreements of their predecessors, especially when the ideological orientation of a sitting statesman differs from that of the previous regime. Danzell (2011) said that right-wing governments are restricting democratic space and pushing left-wing and marginalized political parties into conflict. Similarly, Clare (2014) finds that supporters of left-wing parties are more draconian and willing to punish leaders who have a belligerent attitude, while a right-wing electoral base rewards aggressive politics. Glassmyer, Katherine – Sambanis, Nicholas, “Rebel-military integration and civil war termination,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol.